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Abstract: Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort
people’s consideration of invertebrate minds and that the moral risks of false negatives in
sentience research deserve greater consideration under precautionary frameworks. In this
commentary, I draw comparisons between biases that concern wild animals and conditions in
nature, arguing that the moral risks of disregarding the possible mental welfare of
invertebrates are compounded by facts about their lives in the wild.
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In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) highlight important considerations
concerning the possible mental welfare of invertebrates, who have previously been neglected
in the ethical and scientific literature. M&P’s arguments touch on two main points related to
the interpretation of research on the mental states of these animals: (1) people are subject to
a number of affective biases reducing their ability to perceive the scientific and ethical
significance of this research; and (2) the moral risks that come with ignoring the possible
mental welfare of invertebrates have been improperly addressed. I also discuss the following
related points: (1a) affective biases distort people’s views of wild animals, leading them to
ignore certain facts about their lives; and (2a) these facts compound the moral risks that arise
from disregarding their potential mental welfare.
Biases Against Wild Invertebrates. M&P present evidence of cognitive-affective biases which
shape our beliefs and judgements on invertebrate minds. These biases parallel commonly
accepted views about nature and the lives of wild animals. For example, people’s interest in
and aesthetic appreciation of wild animals are correlated with how much they resemble
humans in their biology, morphology, and behaviour (Burghardt and Herzog 1980; Kellert
1985; Batt 2009). It is also common to think of nature as an idyllic place where there is a
natural “order” or a “balance” of states, ignoring other facts about it that are considered less
interesting or distasteful (Kellert 1991; Burton 2015; Waldhorn 2019). These biases are
recognised across disciplines and levels of education; however, they are do not reflect actual
circumstances in nature, nor relations between wild animals and ecological processes
(Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Cuddington 2001; Horta 2010). In addition, they might lead one
to downplay or underestimate the significance of the following two important facts about
nature:
(1) All animals reproduce in excess of the carrying capacity of their environments; only
one child per parent must survive and reproduce for a population to remain stable over time.
Invertebrates are among the most fecund animals, sometimes reproducing in the tens to
hundreds of thousands of offspring per clutch (Hapgood 1979; Solbrig and Solbrig 1979;
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Brueland 1995). A consequence of these facts is that most invertebrate animals who come
into existence are likely to die before maturing, usually as infants (Horta 2015; Tomasik 2015;
Soryl 2018). This suggests that the welfare of most invertebrates coming into existence might
be negative at the time of their deaths, and possibly also throughout their short lives.1
(2) M&P state that “Invertebrate brains comprise upwards of 99% of the brains that
exist on Earth”. Even if we only consider terrestrial arthropods – a certain subset of
invertebrates that have been researched for possibly having minds – preliminary estimates
place their numbers in the range of 1017 to 1019 (Tomasik 2018). Compared to how many
mammals and birds are estimated to exist (between 1011 to 1012), there may be as many as
one hundred thousand to one hundred million times as many terrestrial arthropods in the
world at any given point.2
Compounded Moral Risks. These two facts about the reproduction and estimated numbers
of extant invertebrates have potentially dire consequences for their welfare if they are
sentient beings. M&P consider Birch’s (2017) Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle as a
possible approach to managing this uncertainty. They discuss three key areas where the
framework might be improved: (1) The assumption that sentience can always be inferred by
homological inference within a given order should be defended. (2) The evidential threshold
for precaution should be expanded to avoid cases of underdetermination. (3) Moral risks
should be considered more closely alongside empirical evidence given the high costs of false
negatives. This final point is relevant to the facts discussed above about the lives of wild
invertebrates.
Given the sheer quantity of extant wild invertebrates, I propose that the moral risks of
denying the possibility of their mental welfare might render negative empirical results
insignificant for ethical and policy-based considerations about them.3 This is because the costs
of finding false negatives are extremely high even if we did have the capacity to test for
sentience throughout the animal kingdom. Indeed, this cost might be many times greater than
M&P posit given how many wild invertebrates are likely to exist at any one time. For example,
let us assume that there is only a 0.01 likelihood that terrestrial arthropods have a mental
welfare, and if they do, that their moral standing is only 0.01 compared to the full moral
standing of a regular mammal or bird (which is 1). Assuming the conservative ranges in
footnote 2, the case for considering terrestrial arthropods is ten times more than the case for
considering mammals and birds. Assuming the generous ranges in footnote 2, the case for
considering terrestrial arthropods is ten thousand times more than the case for considering
mammals and birds.4
The above estimates assume many variables which I have not argued for; however, it
does highlight the potential scope of the moral risks M&P mention in passing. How these risks
should be managed in practice is beyond the scope of this commentary, although it reduces
the viability of the “overgeneralization has moral costs” rebuttal against taking moral risks
seriously (M&P, p. 18).
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Assuming that these animals have a mental welfare to begin with.
1012 / 1017 = 0.00001
1011 / 1019 = 0.00000001
3
Assuming that their negative welfare is morally considerable to begin with, which has previously been
defended: see Hadley 2006; Horta 2013; Faria 2016; and Knutsson and Munthe 2017.
4
((0.01 x 1017) x 0.01) / 1012 = 10
((0.01 x 1019) x 0.01) / 1011 = 10,000
2
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